Based mainly on the use of Navy Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) paid by ship owners, Italian maritime security legislation also allows for the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) when VPDs are not available. Hence, Italy has adopted a hybrid anti-piracy approach that entails two different forms of private sector involvement: the financing and partial control of public military forces by the maritime industry and the provision of armed security by PCASP, an option that includes Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). While limited, this opening to the commercial sector is significant as one of the first of its kind in a state that has adopted a tight monopoly over the provision of armed services, and can be explained as the interplay between the willingness to respond to the needs of the maritime industry and a long-standing resistance against loosening state control over the use of force.
Introduction
In order to contain the piracy threat, Italy has recently allowed for the use of armed teams aboard Italian flagged vessel, adopting a dual, hybrid approach. Based mainly on the use of Vessel 2 Protection Detachments (VPDs) provided by the Navy, Italian legislation also permits ship owners to resort to Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) should VPDs be unavailable. Far from being unique to Italy, this dual approach to maritime security has also been adopted by Belgium and more recently by France, and it is currently being discussed in The Netherlands.
Hence, an analysis of the Italian case is crucial not only due to the intrinsic importance of the Italian shipping industry and its exposure to pirates attacks, but also as a source of broader insights into the evolution, drivers and implications of maritime security policies in Europe and worldwide.
This chapter investigates the Italian antipiracy approach. The first two sections analyse the Italian response to the emergence of the piracy threat before and after 2011, when legislation allowing for the use of armed personnel aboard Italian flagged vessels was enacted. Section three focuses on the provisions regulating the use of PCASP, presently restricted to a specific set of circumstances. The conclusion will further explore the drivers of this hybrid approach, thereby unravelling the peculiarities and likely trajectory of Italian maritime security.
Background: the Italian anti-piracy approach before 2011
Italy has a long-standing maritime tradition that persists in the 21 st century, an unsurprising reality given Italy's geographic position and the length of its coastline. The maritime cluster, as a whole, produces around 2,5% of the national GDP (Federazione del Mare 2011). More than 50% of Italian foreign trade, both for import and export, is transported by sea and Italy's merchant fleet has grown steadily between 1998 and 2011, rising from 8 million gross tonnes (GT) to its current size of 18 million GT (Confitarma 2014) . This figure places Italy as a flagging country, at fifth place 3 in Europe, after Malta, Greece, Cyprus, and the UK. If deadweight tonnage (DWT) is taken as a unit of measurement instead, Italy's fleet ranks sixth in Europe after Greece, Malta, Cyprus, the UK and Norway, with an overall dimension of 21 millions DWT. In terms of size, the Italian flagged fleet is thus similar to the UK's (19 GT, 21 DWT) and Norway's (17 GT, 21 DWT) , and slightly larger than Germany's (15 GT, 17 DWT) (UNCTAD 2013). The chart below compares the number of attacks suffered by Italian vessels in comparison to the three European countries with similar-sized fleets covered in this special issue. repeatedly stated its opposition to the use of armed teams onboard, fearing an escalation of violence in the attacks -a position originally shared also by the Italian Navy (Repubblica 2009 ).
Much of the Italian naval traffic is intra-
The Union was particularly critical of the use of PCASP (SdM 2010 and . On the other hand, the small Italian private security sector was steadily pushing for change, advocating the employment of PCASP aboard Italian vessels. Carlo Biffani, owner and CEO of Security Consulting
Group, made frequent statements in support of the use of PCASP in the national media (Grignetti 2009 , Bongiorni 2011 , SCG website 2011 .
The actor that eventually revised its stance and tipped the balance in favour of armed protection was Confitarma, the association representing 96% of the Italian shipping industry. The disagreement between those in favour and those against the employment of armed teams was not the only point polarizing the anti-piracy debate: divergence also emerged between those who preferred military protection and those leaning in favour of the private security sector.
During the hearing before the Senate (2011) Hence, while the provision of maritime armed security services remains public, the Italian shipping industry has to cover the costs. A blurring of the line between the public and the private domain is also apparent in relation to the issue of authority on board. As stated in the ad hoc agreement between the Ministry of Defence and Confitarma (2011), while Italian VPDs are invested with law enforcement powers for all the offences related to piracy activities, the Master retains complete authority over governing the ship, and is only prevented from surrendering the vessel to pirates without explicit consent of the VPD. These provisions came under heavy scrutiny in February 2012, when two members of an Italian VPD were arrested and charged with the killing of two Indian fishermen they had mistaken for pirates after the Master of the ship on which they were embarked consented to local authorities' request to land on Indian soil (Ronzitti 2014 , Bevilacqua 2014 . The diplomatic consequences and legal ramifications of the two Italian officers' prosecution -still ongoing at the time of writing -are beyond the scope of this article. The Italian
Marines case, however, epitomizes the dangers arising from detaching Navy teams on commercial 9 vessels, and has been presented by various commentators worldwide as an argument in favour of the private solution (Caldwell 2012) . Indeed, the Italian Senate Committee (2012: 12) acknowledged that "the use of private teams instead of active duty military personnel may -due to their commercial nature -avoid diplomatic complications in case of incidents". At the time of writing, however, the detachment of VPDs is still ongoing. The 12 Italian Navy teams that are currently active have conducted over 300 escorting missions (Senato 2012). In contrast, as will be explained in detail in the next section, the role of the commercial sector has remained a secondary option, which has become available only in late 2013 and only in a specific set of circumstances.
Private security teams on Italian vessels
The Law 130/2011 did not only introduce the use of VPDs but also allowed for the use of PCASP aboard Italian ships. As previously explained, there are some general restrictions on the possibility to employ armed teams, both uniformed and private: vessels wishing for armed protection are required to adopt at least one of the shipping industry Best Management Practices and to transit areas identified by the Ministry of Defence as high-risks. In addition, the private option is subject to further, specific limitations. Guard PCASP on board the tanker Giacinta also fired rocket flares at pirate boats. When these measures proved to be unsuccessful, the guards used their firearms to discharge some warning shots, forcing the pirates to withdraw (Ansa 2014) . To date, PMSCs have conducted around 50 transits on Italian flagged ships, as opposed to over 300 escorting missions carried out by VPDs. In sum, the recent Italian opening to maritime private security, still limited but likely to increase further in the future, is extremely significant as one of the first of its kind in a state that has adopted a very tight monopoly over the provision of armed services. The opening to commercial security that occurred after 2011 can ultimately be explained as the interplay between the willingness to respond to the needs of a strategic industry accounting for a meaningful share of the national economy and a long-standing resistance against loosening state control and management of the use of force. The resulting outcome has been a peculiar public-private hybrid, the effectiveness of which has yet to be fully tested.
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